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Thank You All the Same, but I’d Rather Not
Be Seized Today: The Constitutionality of
Ruse Checkpoints under the Fourth
Amendment
NADIA B. SOREE†
INTRODUCTION
American roadways have increasingly become a major
point of interaction between citizens and police. A
Department of Justice study conducted in 2008 revealed that
almost sixty percent of all contact between United States
residents and police arose in the context of traffic incidents.1
Moreover, approximately five percent of all traffic stops
resulted in a search of the driver, vehicle, or both.2 As is the
case with any citizen-police contact, these encounters create
the opportunity for police to investigate a variety of criminal
activity unrelated to the ostensible reason for the contact.

† Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School.
I wish to thank my colleagues at St. Thomas University School of Law for their
helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article, presented as part of the
Faculty Colloquium Series, and would like to thank Tamara Lawson in particular
for her valuable insights. I am also grateful to Christina Fernandez for her
excellent research assistance.
1. CHRISTINE EITH & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
234599, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 3 tbl.2 (2011),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ccp08.pdf. Interestingly, while the overall
percentage of residents having contact with police (for any reason) has declined
from 21% in 2002 to 16.9% in 2008, the percentage of residents having trafficrelated contact with police has remained relatively steady—decreasing from
11.1% in 2002 to 10% in 2008. Id. at 3 tbl.3. In fact, during this time period, the
percentage of all resident-police contact arising from traffic-related incidents has
increased, from 52.8% in 2002 to 59.2% in 2008. Id. at 3 tbl.2.
2. Id. at 10 tbl.14.
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Although the primary focus of this Article is on the use
of one particular investigative tool—the ruse narcotics
checkpoint—the importance of carefully and critically
evaluating the ways in which police officers are permitted to
confront and interact with citizens on the roads cannot be
overstated. Numerous studies have demonstrated that
minority drivers are stopped disproportionately in
comparison to their white counterparts.3 And, as all too
many news stories have recently reminded us, these traffic
stops can lead to tragic consequences and loss of life. As only
one of many examples of the danger—particularly to young
African American men—inherent in a routine traffic stop,
the reader may remember that, on a summer evening in
Minnesota, Philando Castile was shot to death in the
presence of his girlfriend and her young daughter after being
pulled over for a broken taillight.4 Routine traffic stops put
officers at risk as well; one report indicates that of sixty-four
officer fatalities involving a firearm in 2016, three such
fatalities occurred during traffic stops.5 Thus, it is imperative
to reassess policing on the roadways, and, in particular, the
ways in which the Supreme Court has adopted an overly
permissive and deferential stance on the investigative
approaches that can be utilized by police under the Fourth
3. See, e.g., AMY FARRELL ET AL., NORTHEASTERN U. INST. ON RACE & JUSTICE,
RHODE ISLAND TRAFFIC STOP STATISTICS ACT FINAL REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1 (2003), http://www.dot.ri.gov/community/CCPRA/docs/2003_Rhode_Island_
Traffic_Stop_Statistics_Final_Report_NU.pdf (“In most communities in Rhode
Island non-white drivers are stopped disproportionately to their presence in the
driving population.”); STEPHEN M. HAAS ET AL., DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS.,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., WEST VIRGINIA TRAFFIC STOP
STUDY FINAL REPORT (2009), http://www.djcs.wv.gov/ORSP/SAC/Documents/WV
AC_Traffic_NEWOverviewofStatewideFindings.2009.pdf (“State-level results
indicate that black drivers are 1.64 times more likely . . . [and] Hispanics were
1.48 times more likely to be stopped compared to white drivers.”).
4. Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile,
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/policeshooting;trial-philando-castile.html?mcubz=0.
5. NAT’L LAW ENF’T OFFICERS MEM’L FUND, PRELIMINARY 2016 LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER FATALITIES REPORT 1–2 (2016), http://www.nleomf.org/
assets/pdfs/reports/Preliminary-2016-EOY-Officer-Fatalities-Report.pdf.
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Amendment.6
The Court has, through numerous decisions, facilitated
police investigation of criminal activity in the guise of traffic
enforcement, rendering the roadways a significant front in
fighting the so-called “War on Drugs.” For example, the
Court has held that “mere[] passengers” cannot claim a
“legitimate expectation of privacy” in the cars they occupy,
and thus, cannot seek to suppress evidence found in the
unlawful searches of those vehicles.7 Thus, even unlawful
searches, at least of those vehicles containing multiple
occupants, can be fruitful ground for law enforcement
seeking evidence of criminal wrongdoing.8 Of course, perhaps
no decision has been more helpful to law enforcement
seeking to investigate criminal activity than Whren v. United
States, which held that, as long as an officer has probable
cause to stop a vehicle, for example, if the driver committed
even a minor traffic offense, the ensuing seizure is
reasonable regardless of the officer’s true motivations in
executing the stop.9 Although Whren’s holding specifies
6. The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148–49 (1978). The Court in Rakas merged
the “standing” inquiry, governing who may properly invoke the exclusionary rule,
with the substantive definition of a search, holding that the defendant, as a mere
passenger in the automobile that had been searched, lacked the requisite
expectation of privacy to permit him to challenge the search. Id. See infra note
175 for a discussion of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a
description and critique of the Court’s treatment of Fourth Amendment standing,
see Nadia B. Soree, The Demise of Fourth Amendment Standing: From Standing
Room to Center Orchestra, 8 NEV. L. J. 570 (2008).
8. As stated by Justice White in his dissent, “the Court’s opinion today
declares an ‘open season’ on automobiles.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 157 (White, J.,
dissenting).
9. 517 U.S. 806, 813, 819 (1996). As stated by one scholar, “with the traffic
code in hand, any officer can stop any driver any time. The most the officer will
have to do is ‘tail [a driver] for a while,’ and probable cause will materialize like
magic.” David A Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses:
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY
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probable cause as the standard justifying the stop, the
Court’s reasoning supports the conclusion that a traffic stop
based on an officer’s objective reasonable suspicion would
also be justified, regardless of the officer’s subjective
intentions regarding the stop.
Adding to Whren’s potency as a law enforcement tool, the
Court, in Navarette v. California, recently upheld a traffic
stop as supported by “reasonable suspicion that the driver
was intoxicated” based only on an anonymous 9-1-1 caller’s
assertion that the vehicle in question had “run her off the
road,” although the officer, after tailing the truck for five
minutes, did not personally observe any reckless or improper
driving.10 When combined with Whren, the exceedingly low
standard of reasonable suspicion articulated by the Court in
Navarette truly provides officers with the means to “single
out almost whomever they wish for a stop.”11
The Court has also sanctioned suspicionless seizures of
drivers and passengers in their vehicles pursuant to vehicle
checkpoints conducted for purposes of enforcing immigration
laws,12 highway sobriety,13 and licensing and registration
requirements.14 As is the case with any lawful stop, whether
based on suspicion or not, police do not need to ignore other
544, 559 (1997). When the officer’s true motivations for conducting the stop are
unexamined and irrelevant, as long as a stop is based on probable cause, derived
from the traffic violation, it does not matter, for Fourth Amendment purposes, if
the officer was acting from racial animus. As the Court stated, “We of course
agree . . . that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based
on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause,
not the Fourth Amendment.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (emphasis added). For a
more thorough discussion of Whren, see infra Part III. See also Nadia B. Soree,
The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Fourth Amendment: The Plight of Unreasonably
Seized Passengers Under the Heightened Factual Nexus Approach to Exclusion,
51 AM. CRIM L. REV. 601, 639–41 (2014).
10. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686–87 (2014).
11. Whren, 517 U.S. at 818.
12. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 576 (1976).
13. Mich. Dep’t. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
14. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
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indicators of criminal activity that may arise during the stop.
Indeed, officers may ask questions unrelated to the reason
for the stop,15 and are permitted to employ the use of a
narcotics-detection dog,16 as long as these additional
investigative activities are conducted within the lawful
temporal limits of the stop.
Although police may essentially conduct a collateral
narcotics investigation pursuant to and within the confines
of a sobriety or license and registration checkpoint, the Court
drew a line in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, prohibiting
the suspicionless seizures of drivers through checkpoints
conducted for the primary purpose of advancing “the general
interest in crime control.”17 In doing so, the Court expressed
its fear that “[w]ithout drawing the line at roadblocks
designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime
control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent
such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American
life.”18 Thus, despite having found suspicionless checkpoints
for certain purposes, unrelated to general law enforcement
needs, to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,19 the
Court, in Edmond, reiterated its “reluctan[ce] to recognize
exceptions to the general rule of individualized suspicion,”20

15. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) (holding that questioning
regarding defendant’s immigration status during a lawful detention, while police
executed a search warrant, did not extend the detention and therefore did not
require further Fourth Amendment justification).
16. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (“A dog sniff conducted
during a concededly lawful traffic stop . . . does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.”). The Court noted, however, that the outcome would be different if
the dog sniff occurred when the defendant was unlawfully detained, such as if
the traffic stop was “prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete
that mission.” Id. at 407–08.
17. 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000) (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 n.18).
18. Id. at 42.
19. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 576 (1976). See also text accompanying notes 12–14.
20. Edmond, 531 U.S at 43.

390

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

stating that, “[w]hen law enforcement authorities pursue
primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoints such
as here, however, stops can only be justified by some
quantum of individualized suspicion.”21
In the wake of Edmond, police departments developed a
new breed of checkpoint, designed to either, depending on
one’s view, comply with or circumvent the rule and spirit of
Edmond: the ruse checkpoint. Ruse checkpoint programs all
operate in essentially the same fashion.22 Police set up signs
on a highway advising motorists of a drug interdiction
checkpoint ahead. Of course, there is no such checkpoint
ahead on the highway, as such a checkpoint would clearly be
unlawful under Edmond. Nevertheless, the driver “take[s]
the bait,”23 and decides to take the first available exit—
generally one in a remote area that does not immediately
provide access to any services, such as a gas station or

21. Id. at 47. Edmond does not specify, however, what quantum of suspicion
would be necessary, though it would seem that reasonable suspicion would be the
correct standard.
22. Numerous authors have described the basic structure of the ruse narcotics
checkpoint, and have offered their evaluations of these checkpoints. See, e.g.,
Dustin P. Deschamp, Note, The Missouri Supreme Court Approves a
Controversial Police Drug Enforcement Tactic Used on Missouri Highways Code
Name: “Gotcha!” A Case Note on State v. Mack, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 669 (2004);
Daniel R. Dinger & John S. Dinger, Deceptive Drug Checkpoints and
Individualized Suspicion: Can Law Enforcement Really Deceive Its Way into a
Drug Trafficking Conviction?, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2002); Kathryn L. Howard,
Note, Stop in the Name of that Checkpoint: Sacrificing Our Fourth Amendment
Right in Order to Prevent Criminal Activity, 68 MO. L. REV. 485 (2003); Travis
Johnson, Note, Ruse Drug Checkpoints: How the Government’s False Advertising
May Diminish Your Fourth Amendment Rights, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 781 (2005);
Allison M. Low, Comment, Designing a Constitutional Ruse Drug Checkpoint:
What Does the Fourth Amendment Really Protect?, 44 U. S.F. L. REV. 955 (2010);
Theresa A. O’Loughlin, Note, Guerillas in the Midst: The Dangers of Unchecked
Police Powers Through the Use of Law Enforcement Checkpoints, 6 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 59 (2001); Luke R. Spellmeier, Comment, Bypassing the
Fourth Amendment: The Missouri Supreme Court’s Use of “Ruse” Reasonable
Suspicion to Justify De Facto Drug Interdiction Checkpoints, 42 WASHBURN L. J.
209 (2002).
23. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. 2002).
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restaurant.24 This leads to the inference that the driver has
chosen to exit the freeway because he seeks to avoid the
advertised (but nonexistent) checkpoint. Of course, even if
the driver is motivated by the desire to avoid the checkpoint,
this alone does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the
driver is hoping to avoid detection of unlawful drug
possession, as the driver may wish to avoid the hassle and
delay involved in a checkpoint. Or, perhaps the driver simply
does not wish to be seized that day.
At this point, the structures of the checkpoints begin to
vary as they have evolved in response to constitutional
concerns. In what one author has termed “first generation
ruse drug checkpoints,”25 actual checkpoints are located at
the bottom of the exit, and all vehicles exiting the highway
are stopped subject to those checkpoints.26 Proponents of
these checkpoints would argue that this complies with
Edmond because each exiting driver, by seeking to avoid the
checkpoint, has provided the requisite “quantum of
individualized suspicion.”27 At least one state supreme court
has upheld such ruse checkpoints, essentially finding that
the avoidance of the advertised checkpoint alone is sufficient
to raise the reasonable suspicion that justifies the stop.28

24. See, e.g., Webb v. Arbuckle, 456 Fed. Appx. 374, 375 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The
sign was placed a short distance before . . . the exit for . . . a gravel road with no
services such as gas stations, restaurants, or hotels.”); United States v. Wright,
512 F.3d 466, 467 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Other than at the campground there are no
services or signs for services . . . .”); United States v. Valimont, No. 8:12-CR-430,
2013 WL 1975850, at *1 (D. Neb. May 13, 2013) (“The signs were placed such that
the only exit available before the supposed checkpoint was a rural exit with no
advertised services or rest areas.”); Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709 (“[T]he checkpoint
was set up in an isolated and sparsely populated area offering no services to
motorists and was conducted on an evening that would otherwise have little
traffic.”).
25. Low, supra note 22, at 959.
26. Id.
27. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
28. See Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709. The majority pointed to officer testimony
describing the individual defendant’s driving, which included “‘suddenly
veer[ing] off onto the off ramp.’” Id. at 710. However, the dissent noted the
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However, other courts considering these checkpoints have
reached the opposite result, finding that the Fourth
Amendment’s individualized suspicion requirement is not
truly satisfied when each vehicle exiting the freeway is
stopped.29
In response to certain challenges, perhaps most notably
the argument that avoidance of the checkpoint alone is not
sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion of drug
possession,30 two variations to the original ruse narcotics
checkpoint have come into use and have been upheld by a
number of state and federal courts. In the first of these
variations, officers do not stop each car that exits, but instead
apply a totality of the circumstances approach to determine,
on an individual basis, which of the exiting cars to detain.31
Although the decision to leave the highway weighs heavily in
that totality, some additional factors are also considered to
buttress a finding of reasonable suspicion.32 Finally, and
perhaps most commonly, the officers are stationed in a
location from which they can observe the exiting vehicles,
and pull over the vehicles after observing the driver commit
a traffic violation.33 While it is abundantly clear that the
contradiction of invoking a finding of individualized suspicion at a checkpoint
stopping “all those who exited the highway at a certain point.” Id. at 714 (Denvir
Stith, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2002)
(“General profiles that fit large numbers of innocent people do not establish
reasonable suspicion. . . . Finding a quantum of individualized suspicion only
after a stop occurs cannot justify the stop itself.”). See also infra text
accompanying notes 70–71.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Prokupek, 632 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 2011)
(“We previously have held that reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop cannot be
based solely on the fact that a driver exits an interstate after seeing a sign that
a drug checkpoint lies ahead.”).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 81–103.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2006)
(citing to various factors, in addition to exiting the highway, that support a
finding of reasonable suspicion). See also infra text accompanying notes 81–98
(discussing factors the officer in Carpenter observed to support a finding of
reasonable suspicion).
33. See, e.g., Webb v. Arbuckle, 456 Fed. Appx. 374, 375 (5th Cir. 2011);
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traffic violation is a pretext for stopping the driver and
vehicle in this scenario, courts have upheld these seizures
under Whren.34
The critical question, with respect to all three variations
of the ruse drug checkpoint, and most particularly with
respect to the first two mentioned above, is whether the
government should be able to establish reasonable suspicion
exclusively, or in large part, from a threat to violate a
citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights and the citizen’s decision
to assert those rights by seeking to avoid an illegal seizure.35
As stated by Judge Denvir Stith in her dissent from the
court’s decision in State v. Mack,
There is something fundamentally unsettling and counter-intuitive
about labeling as suspicious a person’s conduct in avoiding the
state’s own unconstitutional conduct. The driver would be put in a
“Catch-22” of either proceeding down the highway and being
stopped at an unconstitutional checkpoint, or exiting to avoid it and
risk being stopped at a ruse checkpoint set up to catch those who
had exited. The public should not be put to such a choice.36

Additionally, in the context of the third variety of ruse
checkpoint, where the officer observes—or claims to have
observed37—a traffic violation, this Article argues that the
government should not be permitted to benefit from Whren’s
United States v. Taylor, No. 8:13CR223, 2013 WL 6283819, at *1 (D. Neb. 2013).
34. See, e.g., Webb, 456 Fed. Appx. at 380 (“Thus, because a traffic violation
provides an objective basis for the initial stop . . . the subjective motivations of
the police in making a stop do not affect the constitutional analysis.” (citing
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996)).
35. Of course, unless a particular driver is well versed in the Court’s
checkpoint jurisprudence, he very well may not know that the threatened
checkpoint, had it actually existed, would have been unlawful.
36. 66 S.W.2d 706, 717 (2002) (Denvir Stith, J., dissenting).
37. See United States v. Prokupek, 632 F.3d 460, 461–62 (8th Cir. 2011) for
testimony of officer regarding the driver’s failure to signal as inconsistent with
his statements at the time of stop. Overwhelmingly, the traffic offenses used to
justify the stops in the ruse checkpoint cases are ones for which there is no
evidence other than the officer’s word, such as failure to come to a complete stop
at a stop sign, failure to signal, or improper lane change. See infra notes 105–08
and accompanying text.
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shielding of official motives when the opportunity to target
and observe the driver only presents itself because of official
misconduct.38
While the Supreme Court has not been called on to
determine the constitutionality of ruse drug checkpoints, in
any of their iterations, the Court has recently ruled on the
question of whether and under what circumstances police
may avail themselves of the exigent circumstances exception
to the warrant requirement,39 when their own conduct
prompts the exigency.40 The Court, in Kentucky v. King, held
that a warrantless search of an apartment was reasonable
where officers, having smelled the odor of marijuana
escaping the apartment, “banged on . . . the door ‘as loud as
[they] could,’” announced their identity, and heard sounds
that led them to believe that the destruction of evidence was
imminent.41 In considering the scope of “the so-called ‘policecreated exigency’ doctrine” as an exception to the rule
permitting
warrantless
searches
under
exigent
circumstances, the Court rejected an inquiry into the
subjective bad faith of the officers in creating the exigency.42
The Court endorsed, instead, an objective inquiry, holding
that “the exigent circumstances rule applies when the police
do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.”43 This

38. See infra Part III. This does not require, as the Court often seeks to avoid,
an examination of individual subjective motivations, as the signs warning
motorists of the upcoming drug interdiction checkpoint themselves provide
objective evidence of the threat to violate Fourth Amendment rights. Further, it
requires very little imagination to conclude that when officers specifically target
and stop motorists who have exited the highway to avoid the checkpoint, the
traffic offenses cited are merely a pretext for the true reason for the stop: a drug
investigation.
39. The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement was
firmly recognized by the Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
40. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 455 (2011).
41. Id. at 456.
42. Id. at 461, 464.
43. Id. at 469 (emphasis added).
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Article argues that King is directly analogous to the use of
ruse drug checkpoints, and that courts considering the
constitutionality of these checkpoints should be guided by
the Court’s ruling in King.
Part I of this Article provides a brief background on
vehicle checkpoints generally, and ruse drug checkpoints in
particular. It also surveys the existing case law regarding
ruse drug checkpoints, and categorizes the various levels of
individualized suspicion offered to justify these stops: (1)
avoidance of the threatened checkpoint alone; (2) avoidance
of the threatened checkpoint as a major factor in a totality
analysis; and (3) commission of a traffic offense by a driver
who has avoided the threatened checkpoint. Part II discusses
the standard of reasonable suspicion as it pertains to these
checkpoints, and to seizures in general, focusing on
avoidance of the checkpoint as evidence of suspicious or
criminal activity. Further, it explores a dichotomy in Fourth
Amendment protection: where an individual seeks to limit
exposure to the government in the context of a search, he
gains or strengthens his constitutional protection. However,
in the context of a seizure, when an individual seeks to limit
physical exposure and contact with the government, this
becomes a basis for diminishing his protection. Part III
discusses Kentucky v. King in greater detail, further
developing the analogy between unlawfully created exigent
circumstances and the use of ruse drug checkpoints. That
Part concludes that the Court’s ruling in King should govern
the checkpoint context as well, arguing that even in the third
category of cases, where a driver has committed a traffic
offense, Whren should not apply, and the officer should bear
a heightened burden of demonstrating that the traffic stop is
not pretextual.
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I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE VEHICLE
CHECKPOINT
A. Calling All Cars, Checkpoint Ahead: Suspicionless
Seizures on American Roadways
While the history and evolution of vehicle checkpoints
have been fully developed elsewhere in the scholarly
literature,44 a brief exposition of the case law and doctrine
regarding these checkpoints is helpful to understand the
ruse narcotics checkpoint in its proper context. The Supreme
Court has permitted the suspicionless seizures of drivers
through both permanent and temporary checkpoints for a
variety of purposes. In 1976, the Court in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte eschewed the usual Fourth Amendment
norm requiring some level of individualized suspicion to
justify the seizure of an individual, upholding the
constitutionality of brief questioning at a permanent
checkpoint conducted for purposes of immigration
enforcement.45 The Court’s rationale for upholding the
checkpoint foreshadows the balancing test formally adopted
in subsequent checkpoint cases, which requires
consideration of the governmental purpose and the
checkpoint’s effectiveness in advancing that purpose,
weighed against the level of intrusion suffered by the
individual.46

44. See, e.g., Edwin J. Butterfoss, A Suspicionless Search and Seizure
Quagmire: The Supreme Court Revives the Pretext Doctrine and Creates Another
Fine Fourth Amendment Mess, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 419, 419 (2007); Deschamps,
supra note 22; Eustace T. Francis, Combating the Drunk Driving Menace:
Conditioning the Use of Public Highways on Consent to Sobriety Checkpoint
Seizure, 59 ALB. L. REV. 599, 603–04 (1995); Johnson, supra note 22, at 782.
45. 428 U.S. 543, 556–64 (1976).
46. See id. at 562 n.15 (finding the location of the checkpoint reasonable in
light of the high number of apprehensions and the relatively light flow of
legitimate traffic between San Diego and Los Angeles). The Court set out the
factors used to assess the constitutionality of a seizure in Brown v. Texas,
requiring courts to weigh “the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure,
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Thus, the Court began its analysis by noting the large
numbers of illegal immigrants within the country and the
difficulties of detecting unlawful entries, ultimately
concluding that “[i]nterdicting the flow of illegal
entrants . . . poses formidable law enforcement problems.”47
The Court continued by examining the particular
characteristics of permanent checkpoints, designed by the
Border Patrol to ensure effectiveness, and by stating that the
particular checkpoint at issue had exposed deportable
individuals within 0.12% of stopped vehicles, which would
have resulted in over 33,000 such apprehensions over an
annual period at a similar rate.48
In concluding that seizures at such checkpoints are
permitted in the absence of reasonable suspicion, the Court
emphasized that these types of programs are “necessary” and
“most important,” and that a requirement of individualized
suspicion would be “impractical.”49 On balance, the Court
viewed the intrusion upon the individual as being “quite
limited.”50 The Court supported this conclusion with a
number of assertions. First, the intrusion itself generally
involved only “a brief question or two and possibly the
production of a document . . . .”51 Second, the Court reasoned
that the permanent nature of the checkpoint, as well as the
lack of individual official discretion in operating the
checkpoint, lessened the gravity of the intrusion because
motorists would not be taken by surprise, nor would they be
the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of
the interference with individual liberty.” 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979).
47. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551–52.
48. See id. at 554.
49. Id. at 556–57.
50. Id. at 557.
51. Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880
(1975)). The Court based its assessment of intrusiveness on the initial checkpoint
seizure, rather than on any subsequent questioning, finding that referral to a
secondary area for further inspection did not require the same level of cause as a
roving stop, and could constitutionally be “made largely on the basis of apparent
Mexican ancestry . . . .” Id. at 563.
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subjected to “abusive or harassing stops.”52
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Court
turned its attention from illegal immigration to highway
sobriety.53 Again, balancing the importance of the
governmental interest served by the checkpoint and its
effectiveness in furthering that interest against the
“objective” and “subjective” intrusion on drivers, the Court
upheld the program.54 In conducting its balancing, the Court
found the “magnitude of the drunk driving problem” to be
beyond dispute, and this particular checkpoint, as well as
other similar ones, to have a hit rate at or above one
percent—making these checkpoints considerably more
effective than the one upheld in Martinez-Fuerte.55
As for the objective intrusiveness of the checkpoint, the
Court found the intrusion of a brief stop for a sobriety check
to be “slight.”56 Subjectively speaking, the Court found this
checkpoint, although a temporary one, “indistinguishable”
from the permanent checkpoint approved in MartinezFuerte, contrasting it with roving-patrol stops.57 The Court

52. Id. at 559. The Court has noted the far more intrusive nature of the roving
patrol stop, stating, “[r]oving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled
roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the
motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, . . . and he is much less
likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.” United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891, 894–95 (1975). Of course, the Court’s description of the roving patrol
and its effect on the surprised motorist sounds precisely like the stops conducted
on remote roadways pursuant to the ruse checkpoints.
53. See 496 U.S. 444, 444 (1990).
54. See id. at 455. As in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court here focused on the initial
stop of the vehicle at the checkpoint, only noting that “[d]etention of particular
motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require satisfaction of an
individualized suspicion standard.” Id. at 451.
55. Id. at 451–55.
56. Id. at 451–52.
57. Id. at 452–53. This characterization was vigorously contested by Justice
Stevens in dissent: “In my opinion, unannounced investigatory seizures are,
particularly when they take place at night, the hallmark of regimes far different
from ours; the surprise intrusion upon individual liberty is not minimal.” Id. at
468–69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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again emphasized the limit on unfettered officer discretion
with respect to the operation of the checkpoint, provided by
the guidelines.58
Previously, in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court also
considered the validity of a checkpoint program, and,
although that particular program was invalidated because of
the lack of guidelines to curb individual discretion, the Court
had suggested approval of another purpose for vehicle
checkpoints: the license and registration check.59 Thus, by
the time the Court was faced with deciding the
constitutionality of a checkpoint designed and operating
primarily for the purpose of interdicting illegal drugs, it had
already approved of checkpoints serving the interests of
immigration enforcement and highway safety. And, while
the Court in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond made clear “that
traffic in illegal narcotics creates social harms of the first
magnitude,”60 and the challenged checkpoint also resulted in
similarly brief detentions when compared to those
experienced by motorists in its previous checkpoint cases,61
the Court took a different course.
The Court distinguished the checkpoint at issue in
Edmond from the earlier approved checkpoints, reasoning
that while the immigration checkpoint had an obvious
connection to the country’s interest in maintaining the
integrity of its borders, and the highway safety checkpoint
had a more direct connection to the roadways and sought to
address a more immediate threat to life and limb, the drug

58. Id. at 452–53 (“Here, checkpoints are selected pursuant to guidelines, and
uniformed officers stop every vehicle.”).
59. 440 U.S. 648, 658, (1979) (“[T]he State[] [has] a vital interest in ensuring
that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that
these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that licensing, registration,
and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed.”).
60. 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000).
61. Id. at 35 (“The city agreed . . . to operate the checkpoints in such a way as
to ensure that the total duration of each stop, absent reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, would be five minutes or less.”).
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interdiction
checkpoint was primarily
aimed
at
62
“pursu[ing] . . . general crime control ends.” For such a
purpose, the Court was loath to suspend the usual Fourth
Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion, noting
that its failure to do so “would do little to prevent such
intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life.”63
Nonetheless, the Court did not, by its language, forbid all
checkpoints with the primary purpose of discovering illegal
narcotics, but held that stops aimed at uncovering such
activity required individualized suspicion.64 Just how much
individualized suspicion would be required to justify a drug
interdiction checkpoint, however, was not specified by the
Court,65 and this lack of specificity paved the way for police
departments to develop a new type of checkpoint: the ruse
narcotics checkpoint.
B. Calling All Cars, Checkpoint Ahead: Ruse Narcotics
Checkpoints
As previously described,66 the ruse checkpoints operate
by deceiving motorists traveling along a highway into
believing that a drug interdiction checkpoint is being
conducted some ways ahead, although, of course, not before
an opportunity to exit the highway. It is not unreasonable to
assume that some or even many of the motorists would avail
themselves of the exit in order to avoid the advertised
checkpoint, whether or not they have anything to hide.67 In
62. Id. at 43.
63. Id. at 42. The Court also rejected the checkpoint despite its lawful
secondary purposes of checking license and registration, and looking for signs of
impairment. Id. at 46–47.
64. Id. at 47.
65. The Court simply held that “[w]hen law enforcement authorities pursue
primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoint such as here, however,
stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion.” Id.
(emphasis added).
66. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
67. In fact, the court in State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. 2002), found
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the first-generation model of the ruse checkpoint,68 however,
the assumption seems to be that most drivers who choose to
exit the highway are seeking to avoid detection of
wrongdoing, and thus, when they are stopped at the actual
checkpoint, at the bottom of the exit ramp, their act of exiting
has provided the “quantum of individualized suspicion”
needed to satisfy Edmond.69
Courts generally have not approved this model of the
ruse checkpoint,70 primarily because stopping each car that
exits, even assuming that a significant portion of those
drivers are seeking to avoid the checkpoint, simply does not
comport with a requirement of suspicion individually
tailored to each car and driver. As stated by the Eighth
Circuit in United States v. Yousif,
General profiles that fit large numbers of innocent people do not
establish reasonable suspicion. Without first stopping the vehicles
and questioning the drivers, the police had no way to determine why
any particular vehicles were exiting at the Sugar Tree Road ramp.
Finding a quantum of individualized suspicion only after a stop
occurs cannot justify the stop itself.71

That argument notwithstanding, the Supreme Court of
Missouri upheld such a checkpoint, and reversed the
this assumption to be reasonable due to the “significant efforts to reduce the
legitimate reasons for taking the exit.”
68. See Low, supra note 22, at 959.
69. Even, assuming arguendo, that Edmond might be satisfied, there is a
strong argument that the ruse checkpoint would not satisfy the Brown v. Texas
test. See supra note 46. As one commentator argues, these “checkpoints are more
intrusive than the other checkpoints that have been considered by courts in the
past. Not only are drivers taken by complete surprise at such stops . . . these
drivers are also deliberately deceived into thinking that the checkpoint is set up
at a different location.” Johnson, supra note 22, at 791–92.
70. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
71. 308 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The Sugar Tree Road
exit (off of Interstate 44 in Phelps County, Missouri) at issue in Yousif was also
the exit used in the ruse checkpoint schemes in at least three other cases: United
States v. Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams,
359 F.3d 1019, 1020 (8th Cir. 2004); and United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005,
1006 (8th Cir. 2004).
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Defendant’s motion to suppress, finding it “reasonable to
conclude that drivers with drugs would ‘take the bait’ and
exit . . . to avoid being questioned at the next exit.”72 The
court continued by noting that the checkpoint was set up at
a time and location to minimize “legitimate reasons for
taking the exit” and also noted the that such deceptive tactics
are effective, all of which bolstered a finding of
reasonableness.73
To avoid the objection raised in Yousif, the ruse
checkpoint evolved in its operation. If stopping each car
would run afoul of Edmond’s requirement of individualized
suspicion, then stopping only those cars whose drivers did in
fact exhibit distinctively suspicious behavior would, in
theory, pass constitutional muster, as long as such behavior
attained the level of reasonable suspicion required for a
temporary investigative stop. Thus, rather than having an
actual checkpoint at the bottom of the exit ramp, officers
place themselves where they can observe the cars that take
the exit after having seen the ruse sign, and execute a stop
only after observing additional suspicious behavior.74
72. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709.
73. Id. The court did allow for the possibility that the evasive behavior alone
might not be enough to justify the stop, stating, however, that “even if the
deceptive drug checkpoint scheme did not alone constitute ‘individualized
suspicion,’ defendant’s particular conduct in exiting at the checkpoint must also
be considered.” Id. Thus, the court was willing to consider the defendant’s sudden
veering onto the ramp as further evidence of suspicion. Id. at 710. As noted by
the dissent, however, because all motorists were being stopped, this “after-thefact” justification was not in fact the basis for the defendant’s being stopped. Id.
at 720 (Denvir Stith, J., dissenting). The majority also relied on United States v.
Brugal, 209 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that avoidance of a ruse
checkpoint furnishes reasonable suspicion. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709. The majority
did note, however, that Brugal involved a challenge to the continued detention of
the motorist, but did not directly address the initial roadblock stopping the
exiting drivers. Id. at 709 n.1.
74. One author describes these “modified ruse drug checkpoints” as differing
from the first-generation checkpoint in two ways: first, not all drivers are stopped
at the exit; and second, officers are also located on the interstate (as opposed to
only at the bottom of the exit ramp) in order to observe suspicious behavior, or a
traffic violation, in the act of exiting the interstate itself. Low, supra note 22, at
965.
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The standard of reasonable suspicion that justifies a
temporary stop in the ruse checkpoint context will be more
thoroughly explored below,75 but for purposes of this Part, it
suffices to say that reasonable suspicion is established when
“a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude . . . that criminal activity may be
afoot.”76 This conclusion, however, cannot be based merely on
an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but
[on] specific reasonable inferences” drawn from the officer’s
experience.77 Similarly to the more demanding standard of
probable cause,78 a determination of sufficiency of the
information is based on an analysis of the “totality of the
circumstances.”79 Thus, if exiting the highway upon seeing
the ruse narcotics checkpoint sign is not enough to establish
reasonable suspicion of drug possession or trafficking80—if it
75. See infra Section II.A.
76. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
77. Id. at 27.
78. The Court, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), defined probable
cause as a “fair probability” of criminal activity, and reaffirmed the “totality-ofthe-circumstances analysis” as the proper approach to determinations of probable
cause. The Court has compared reasonable suspicion to probable cause by
describing the “level of suspicion required for a Terry stop [as] obviously less
demanding than that for probable cause . . . .” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 7 (1989).
79. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328–29 (1990) (holding that the same
totality approach as proscribed by the Court in Gates is applicable to the context
of reasonable suspicion as well, taking into account “the lesser showing required
to meet that standard.”).
80. But see State v. Rose, No. 29,388, 2011 WL 193537, at *5 (N.M. Ct. App.
2011). In Rose, the New Mexico Court of Appeals did not address the legality of
the ruse checkpoint as an investigatory method, stating that the issue was not
properly preserved below. Id. at *3–4 . The Defendant was stopped after
executing an illegal u-turn to avoid the advertised checkpoint, and tried, on
appeal, to raise the argument that such a checkpoint (had it existed) would have
been unlawful under Edmond, and that the placement of the ruse essentially
forced drivers seeking to avoid the unlawful checkpoint to make an illegal u-turn.
Id. at *1–4. While not ruling on the use of the ruse, the court nonetheless upheld
the seizure, stating “where a driver engages in conduct that indicates he is
attempting to evade a narcotics checkpoint, an officer may form a reasonable
suspicion that the driver is in possession of narcotics.” Id. at *4 (citing State v.
Anaya, 2009-NMSC-043, 147 N.M. 100, 217 P.3d 586 (2009) (holding that
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were, then all exiting drivers could be lawfully detained—the
critical question becomes just how much more is needed to
provide the required level of suspicion.
The next generation of ruse checkpoint, briefly discussed
here, differs from the scenario described directly above only
in that other factors are considered, in addition to the
driver’s choice to exit the highway, to justify the detention of
some, but not all, exiting drivers, based on the totality of
circumstances. The Eighth Circuit case of United States v.
Carpenter once again involved the ruse checkpoint at the
Sugar Tree Road exit on Highway 44 in Phelps County,
Missouri.81 The officer, Deputy Rightnowar, in a marked car,
was placed where he could observe “nonlocal traffic” and “get
reason to stop them.”82 According to Carpenter, he had exited
in search of a gas station because he was low on fuel, but in
doing so, he piqued the interest of the waiting officer who
decided to follow the Chevrolet Blazer because it “‘just didn’t
look right for the area.’”83 According to Carpenter, once he
realized there was no service station at this exit, he observed
the patrol car through his rear-view mirror, and, fearing a
trap, executed a U-turn and pulled over to the side of the
road.84 Meanwhile, Rightnowar observed Carpenter’s vehicle
parked on the side of the road and pulled in behind him,
activating his lights.85
In the ensuing conversation between the two, Carpenter
explained that he was traveling in a rental vehicle between
Austin, Texas, and New York, and offered his reason for

avoidance of a sobriety checkpoint supports a reasonable suspicion that the driver
is intoxicated)).
81. 462 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2006).
82. Id. The officer specified that he was focused on cars that were not familiar
to him, or those with license plates from other states. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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leaving the highway.86 However, this did not quell
Rightnowar’s suspicion, as he observed the gas tank to be
one-quarter full.87 Further, although the sign at the Sugar
Tree Road exit indicated a motel and campground, it did not
indicate other services, as were available at other exits. 88
Adding to his suspicion, Rightnowar found Carpenter to
appear nervous, observing “an artery in his neck pulsing.”89
At this point, Rightnowar took possession of Carpenter’s
license and rental documents for approximately five
minutes, observing that the Blazer had been rented not in
Austin, but in El Paso.90 When the officer returned from his
patrol car, he requested consent to search some boxes in the
car, which Carpenter claimed contained tile.91 When
Carpenter refused, Rightnowar ordered Carpenter out of the
vehicle, patted him down for weapons, told him that he
believed Carpenter had drugs in his vehicle, and called a
nearby officer with a narcotics detection dog.92 The dog
subsequently alerted the officers to drugs, and the ensuing
search revealed cocaine in the boxes.93
Interestingly, the district court found Carpenter had
been seized in the absence of reasonable suspicion, relying
primarily on the argument that Carpenter’s act of exiting the
highway was not enough, alone, to support the seizure.94 The
district court did not definitively ascertain the point of
seizure, finding instead that Carpenter had been seized
either when the officer took his documents to his patrol car,

86. Id. at 983–84.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 984.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 984–85.
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or once the officer asked him to exit his vehicle.95 The Eighth
Circuit, however, found that Carpenter was not seized until
the latter event.96 By pushing forward the point of seizure,
the court could now include the information gained by
Rightnowar after he took Carpenter’s license and rental
papers to justify the subsequent seizure, which occurred,
according to the Eighth Circuit, once Rightnowar informed
Carpenter of his suspicion, asked him to exit his car, and
conducted a weapons frisk.
The court summarized the circumstances supporting a
finding of reasonable suspicion, relying heavily on the
following facts: (1) Carpenter exited the highway
immediately after the checkpoint sign, and parked on the
side of the road “for no apparent reason”; (2) he claimed to
have exited—at an exit with no services—in search of a gas
station, even though his gas tank was one-quarter full; (3)
when questioned, he appeared nervous; and (4) although he
claimed to be driving from Austin, his vehicle was in fact
rented in El Paso, “a known source city for drugs.”97 Although
the court noted that some innocent drivers may do the very
things Carpenter did, it ultimately found the circumstances
were “sufficiently unusual and suspicious that they
eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers, and
provide reasonable suspicion to justify the brief detention of
Carpenter . . . .”98 Of course, had the court found Carpenter
was seized when Rightnowar took his license and paperwork,
the discrepancy between the stated origin of travel and the
location of the rental would not have played any role in
establishing suspicion, and it is highly questionable whether,

95. Id. at 985
96. Id.
97. Id. at 987. The fourth factor seemed to play a major role in the court’s
analysis: “[t]his sort of discrepancy between documents and a driver’s
explanation is a legitimate basis for suspicion, particularly where a reasonable
officer could infer that Carpenter’s explanation was an effort to distance himself
from a known source city for drugs.” Id. (citations omitted).
98. Id.
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without that fact, the seizure would have withstood
constitutional scrutiny.
As a comparison, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v.
Neff, although agreeing with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning
that the driver’s choice to exit after the decoy sign is a highly
relevant fact in assessing reasonable suspicion, emphasized
the importance of “additional suspicious circumstances or
independently evasive behavior to justify” an investigative
stop.99 In this particular case, the court concluded that such
additional circumstances did not support a finding of
reasonable suspicion.100 The additional factors considered by
the court in its analysis included the following facts: (1) Neff
(the driver) exited the highway onto a gravel road after the
checkpoint sign; (2) he pulled into and stopped on a driveway;
(3) when he observed the officer who had been tailing him,
he appeared “startled,” then “backed out of the driveway as
if to turn around”; and (4) his vehicle plates were registered
to a neighboring county.101 In its analysis, the court noted
that there was no evidence that Neff engaged in any erratic
driving that would add to the suspicion,102 and, critically,
that Neff had not committed any traffic violations observed
by the officer.103
This leads us to the next, and most common, variant of
the ruse checkpoint case: where drivers who exit after the
checkpoint sign are not stopped based on reasonable
suspicion of drug trafficking, but are stopped because of an

99. United States v. Neff, 681 F.3d 1134, 1142–43 (10th Cir. 2012).
100. Id. at 1143.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1142. The court discussed the Supreme Court decision of Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), and its holding that “an individual’s
‘unprovoked flight upon noticing the police’ and ‘nervous, evasive behavior’ are
relevant factors in determining reasonable suspicion for a brief investigatory
stop. Neff, 681 F.3d at 1141 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124). For a more
thorough discussion of Wardlow and its role in the reasonable suspicion analysis
in the ruse checkpoint context, see infra Part II.
103. Neff, 681 F.3d at 1143.
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observed traffic violation.104 As the previously discussed
cases illustrate, officers who conduct investigative stops
relying on observed factors to support a finding of reasonable
suspicion may later have those stops deemed unlawful, if a
court decides those factors to be insufficient. This
determination may, in turn, depend on when a court decides
the seizure actually occurred. With so much uncertainty, it
is not surprising that this variant of the ruse narcotics
checkpoint is frequently encountered, and often (but not
always) proves successful. It is much easier to avoid a Fourth
Amendment violation, and the outcome is more predictable,
when the officer supports the stop with testimony that he
observed the driver commit a traffic violation, rather than
having to establish a number of suspicious circumstances
that must survive a court’s totality analysis.
Moreover, many of the cases surveyed by this author
involve traffic offenses without independently verifiable
proof, such as a reading on a radar gun to establish a
speeding violation.105 Instead, the violations at issue in these
cases are often proved only through an officer’s observation
and later, his testimony, that the driver failed to comply with
the traffic code. For example, the drivers in these cases were
pulled over due to the officer’s observation of a stop-sign
104. Although targeted because they have exited the highway, and thus, they
are in fact suspected of drug trafficking, the stops of these drivers are justified on
the basis of their having committed a traffic violation. In one case included in this
category of checkpoint cases, the passenger of the exiting vehicle discarded an
object from the vehicle window, and therefore, the stop was based on a littering,
rather than traffic, violation. Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006).
The object turned out to be a marijuana pipe. Id.
105. It is possible that a traffic violation could be recorded by the patrol car’s
video, which is what occurred in United States v. Valimont, No. 8:12-CR-430,
2013 WL 1975850, at *3 (D. Neb. May 13, 2013). Although the camera recorded
the defendant’s failure to use his signal, the officer failed to turn on the
microphone. Id. at *3. However, most of the cases surveyed by the author did not
mention video evidence of the purported traffic violations, or, if there was
available video footage, as in United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 472 (8th Cir.
2008), the camera was not activated until after the officer witnessed the violation
and decided to execute a stop. See also United States v. Prokupek, 632 F.3d 460,
461 (8th Cir. 2011).
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violation,106 a signal violation,107 or a lane violation.108 One
such case exemplifies how these traps are set up, and how
courts typically uphold the seizures that occur. In United
States v. Johnson, various police departments in a Texas
county operated a typical ruse checkpoint—setting up a
cautionary sign warning of an upcoming narcotics checkpoint
less than a mile away from an exit located in, as is typical, a
“remote area where there are no services or facilities . . . and
[which] does not lead to any other major highway.”109 In
addition, the exit used to bait the unsuspecting drivers was
located approximately two miles past a well-lit exit with an
abundance of services, restaurants, and places of lodging.”110
Only those drivers who committed a traffic violation were
stopped by officers, but the chosen location was not only
typical in its remoteness, but also ideal for creating ample
opportunities for traffic violations to occur.111 As described
by the court:
It is somewhat difficult for an individual unfamiliar with the exit to
avoid committing a traffic violation. The speed limit quickly drops
from 65 miles per hour to 25 miles per hour and there are no lights
at the exit. [The road] is a two-lane road divided by a yellow
centerline. It is easy to cross the centerline when entering [the road]
from the . . . exit ramp, since there is only a short break in the
centerline to allow entry into the lane of travel. Crossing the yellow
centerline is a traffic offense under Texas law.112

106. United States v. Chavez Loya, 528 F.3d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 2008); Wright,
512 F.3d at 467; United States v. Williams, 359 F.3d 1019, 1020 (8th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2004).
107. Webb v. Arbuckle, 456 F. App’x. 374, 375 (5th Cir. 2011); Prokupek, 632
F.3d at 461; United States v. Wendt, 465 F.3d 814, 815 (7th Cir. 2006); Valimont,
2013 WL 1975850, at *1.
108. United States v. Grier, 127 F. App’x. 712, 713 (5th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Johnson, 59 M.J. 666, 669 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2003).
109. Johnson, 59 M.J. at 668.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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The court continued by finding it “undisputed” that the
officers established probable cause to stop drivers by
observing the violations, and also that it was “undisputed
that the real purpose of the stops was not to cite motorists
for minor traffic violations, but to interdict illicit drugs on a
known drug-trafficking route.”113 In fact, while close to onethird of the exiting drivers were stopped for minor violations,
not one citation was issued during the checkpoint’s
operation.114 Johnson was pulled over, rather predictably, for
crossing the center while entering the road, after having
exited the interstate.115 He then consented to the search of
his vehicle, resulting in the discovery of marijuana.116
The court engaged in a fairly thorough exposition of the
relevant case law, finding these facts “clearly
distinguishable” from both Edmond117 and the Eighth
Circuit case of United States v. Yousif,118 which the
defendant relied on for the very simple reason that, unlike
both Edmond and Yousif, there was no actual checkpoint or
roadblock stopping all passing motorists, and only those who
committed a violation were detained.119 While the purpose,
as in Edmond, may have been drug interdiction, and the use
of deception may have been identical to that used in
Yousif,120 the court concluded that “[t]he stop of a motor
vehicle based on an observed violation of a traffic law is a
stop based upon probable cause and is, therefore, reasonable

113. Id.
114. Id. at 668–69.
115. See id. at 669.
116. Id.
117. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). See supra notes 60–
64 and accompanying text.
118. 308 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2003). See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying
text.
119. Johnson, 59 M.J. at 671–73.
120. Id. at 672.
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under the Fourth Amendment.”121 And so, even as the court
found that the “traffic offenses were simply a pretext for
[officers’] real motivation of intercepting illicit narcotics in
the vehicles of those who might be attempting to evade the
nonexistent drug checkpoint,”122 the court cited to Whren v.
United States,123 for its holding that as long as the seizure is
objectively justified, the officer’s state of mind or true
motivation has no real relevance.124 Further, while the traffic
stop would not have justified the subsequent search of the
vehicle, Johnson’s consent was all the justification needed.125
While the exit used to snare suspected drug traffickers
in Johnson created a strong likelihood that an unwitting
driver would commit a traffic violation, such as the lane
violation committed in that case, the types of violations
frequently seen in these ruse checkpoint cases raise the
possibility of police fabrication—or, at the very least, a
contested version of the facts leading to conflicting
testimonies of officers and defendants at suppression

121. Id. at 673 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
122. Id.
123. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
124. Johnson, 59 M.J. at 673. See also United States v. Williams, 359 F.3d
1019, 1021 (8th Cir. 2004) (relying on Whren to uphold objectively justified
seizures, regardless of “a law enforcement officer’s ulterior motives.”).
125. Johnson, 59 M.J. at 673. Of course, once the officer conducts the initial
stop of a driver, he will likely seek to obtain consent to search the vehicle. In
many of the cases surveyed here, the subsequent searches were indeed based on
consent. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Wendt, 465 F.3d 814, 816 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Grier,
127 F. App’x. 712, 713 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Valimont, No. 8:12-CR430, 2013 WL 1975850, at *2 (D. Neb. May 13, 2013). Alternatively, the detained
motorist may exhibit additional indicia of suspicion, or make incriminating
statements that can provide an officer with probable cause to search. See, e.g.,
Webb v. Arbuckle, 456 F. App’x. 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that officers did
not act unreasonably in searching the entire car of a doctor who informed the
officers that she “might be in possession of controlled substances and was
uncertain what substances she had in the car.”). Or, a drug detection canine
available at the scene may alert to the presence of contraband, providing the
necessary probable cause to search. See United States v. Prokupek, 632 F.3d 460,
461 (8th Cir. 2011).
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hearings. When there is no proof of the violation other than
the officer’s observation, judges and magistrates must base
their factual conclusions on their assessments of credibility.
For example, in United States v. Wendt, two officers—
one (Officer Parkinson) stationed on an interstate overpass
and using binoculars, and the other (Officer Boerm)
stationed at the top of the exit ramp—separately observed
the defendant make two distinct sets of traffic offenses:
crossing two lanes in order to take the ruse exit without
signaling, and straddling the roadway’s center line after
having exited.126 The court stated, “[a]s expected, Wendt’s
version of the facts differ [sic].”127 The defendant claimed he
had only crossed through one lane in order to exit the
interstate, used his signal, and upon exiting, remained in the
proper lane.128 Based on his own observations and the
information he received from Parkinson, Boerm stopped
Wendt, obtained consent to search the vehicle, and
discovered 19.6 kilograms of cocaine.129
However, it was not until Wendt was in custody that
Boerm prepared a written warning, and although he had
originally indicated the time on the warning as 13:40, he
later corrected it to state 15:40.130 In addition, Wendt pointed
to several other facts in order to call the officers’ credibility
into question: in his testimony, Officer Parkinson “‘refus[ed]
to acknowledge that he worked as part of a drug interdiction
detain’ [sic] and instead characterized his assignment as
‘conducting traffic stops.’”131 However, Parkinson, if he was
indeed searching for traffic violations, was doing so without
a radar gun, seemed to target vehicles from out-of-state, and
126. Wendt, 465 F.3d at 815.
127. Id. at 816 (emphasis added).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. Officer Boerm indicated that he often confused the two numbers in
military time. Id.
131. Id. at 817.
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testified that, although he observed the failure to signal, he
could not see the vehicle’s license plate.132 On appeal, the
court found these inconsistencies “minor and unpersuasive”
and exhibited the usual deference to the trial judge in
assessing credibility.133
Although in most of the surveyed cases the court found
the police version of events more credible, United States v.
Prokupk illustrates an instance where the appellate court
concluded that the inconsistencies in the officer’s testimony
were too great to overlook, and thus overturned the district
court’s finding as clearly erroneous.134 After Ronald
Prokupek exited the interstate following the ruse checkpoint
sign and turned onto a local road, Trooper Estwick stopped
Prokupek’s vehicle.135 As indicated by the officer’s dashboard
camera, which had been activated immediately after the
traffic stop, Estwick explained that Prokupek failed to signal
his exit from the interstate, but that he properly used his
signal upon turning onto the county road at the bottom of the
exit ramp.136 However, at the suppression hearing, Estwick
testified that stop was based on probable cause that
Prokupek failed to signal his turn onto the county road.137
When pressed by defense counsel with respect to the
inconsistency between his initial statement to Prokupek at
the time of the stop and his testimony, Estwick repeated
several times simply that Prokupek “failed to signal” and
admitted that he did not (and, in fact, could not) actually see
him exit the interstate.138

132. Id.
133. Id. The trial judge’s credibility determination would need to be clearly
erroneous in order to be overturned on appeal. Id.
134. 632 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2011).
135. Id. at 461.
136. Id. During the traffic stop, a narcotics dog indicated the presence of what
turned out to be 151 grams of methamphetamine. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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The magistrate judge presiding over the suppression
hearing found Estwick’s testimony at that hearing to be
credible, despite the inconsistency.139 However, upon de novo
review, the district court adopted a broader finding that
effectively rendered the inconsistency of little import, finding
that, “‘Prokupek failed to [signal] at one of the two described
places.’”140 On appeal, in light of the fact that Estwick had
not been located in a position to view Prokupek’s exit from
the interstate, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for clarification of its finding.141 The district
court supplemented its earlier finding, acknowledging the
inconsistency between Estwick’s testimony and his
contemporaneous statement at the traffic stop, while
ultimately concluding that the traffic stop statement was “an
unintentional misstatement” and that Prokupek had, in fact,
failed to signal his turn onto the county road.142
The Eighth Circuit characterized the district court’s
finding as an “attempt[] to dismiss the contradiction” and
found “no evidence in the record that supports this finding,”
noting that Estwick himself offered no explanation for the
inconsistency in his statements when cross-examined by
defense counsel.143 The Eighth Circuit vacated the
convictions, stating:
Because Trooper Eswtick’s testimony at the hearing is so clearly
and affirmatively contradicted by his own statement at the time of
the events, in the absence of any explanation for this contradiction
that is supported by the record, we conclude that Trooper Eswtick’s
after-the-fact testimony at the suppression hearing is “implausible
on its face,” and we are left with the “firm and definite conviction

139. Id.
140. Id. (emphasis added). The district court denied the suppression motions
of Prokupek and his passenger, and entered their conditional guilty pleas, after
which Prokupek and his passenger appealed the court’s denial of their
suppression motions. Id. at 461–62.
141. Id. at 462.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 463.
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that a mistake has been made . . . .”144

Thus, because the Eighth Circuit found that the district
court’s crediting of Estwick’s suppression hearing testimony
was clearly erroneous, and because the government had no
other basis for justifying the traffic stop, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the traffic stop constituted an illegal seizure,
and that the drugs that had been found pursuant to that stop
were inadmissible as fruit of that illegality.145
While Prokupek provides an example where ultimately,
the officer’s proffered justification for the traffic stop leading
to the discovery of narcotics was disbelieved, it is important
to note that, before the Eighth Circuit rendered its decision,
two levels of judicial review, by the magistrate and district
court judges, all but ignored the very real possibility that
Trooper Estwick fabricated the probable cause to conduct the
traffic stop. Prokupek also highlights why the third
generation of ruse checkpoint stops—those based on traffic
offenses allegedly committed by drivers upon exiting after
seeing the checkpoint sign—is the most common and also
potentially the most problematic because of the ease with
which officers can conduct traffic stops, either based on
actual or fabricated violations of the traffic code. The next
Part of this Article, however, turns once more to the issue at
the heart of the ruse checkpoint: the suspicion generated by
the driver who “take[s] the bait”146 and chooses to exit the
highway, only to drive right into that which he sought to
avoid.

144. Id. (internal citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. 2002).

416

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

II. TAKING THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED: ADVERTISING YOUR
GUILT OR ASSERTING YOUR RIGHTS?
A. Avoiding a Checkpoint as an Assertion of the Right to Be
Free of Unreasonable Seizures
As briefly mentioned above,147 Terry v. Ohio authorized
police to conduct temporary investigative stops based on
reasonable suspicion—a lesser standard than the probable
cause required for an arrest.148 While Terry laid the
groundwork for the use of the ruse checkpoint as a tool in
fighting drug trafficking, Illinois v. Wardlow provided the
cornerstone supporting the rationale used to justify this
particular method of ensnaring unwitting drivers.149 In
Wardlow, the Court eschewed a per se rule respecting flight
and its role in generating the suspicion necessary to support
an investigative stop, but nevertheless upheld a stop as
properly based on reasonable suspicion considering two
factors alone: the defendant’s “presence in an area of heavy
narcotics trafficking” and the defendant’s “unprovoked
flight” from police.150 Extrapolating Wardlow’s holding to the
ruse checkpoint scenario, one can at first glance understand
the logic underpinning even the first-generation ruse
checkpoint.151 The drivers are originally located on an
interstate (an area with a high potential for drug trafficking)
and, upon being notified of a police presence ahead (the ruse),
exit the highway in order to avoid contact with law
enforcement.152
147. See supra note 76.
148. 392 U.S. 1, 33, 37 (1968).
149. See 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
150. Id. at 124. In Wardlow, two officers driving as a part of a four-car caravan
through an area known for drug trafficking spotted the defendant standing near
a building holding an opaque bag. Id. at 121–22. As the caravan passed the
building, the defendant “looked in the direction of the officers and fled.” Id.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26.
152. While it is a stretch to classify an entire interstate as a high-crime area,
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However, on closer inspection, one can also see why most
courts rejected the first-generation ruse checkpoint,
requiring more factors to be added to the mix before
declaring the standard of reasonable suspicion to be met.
First, it is problematic to classify an interstate as an area
known for drug trafficking. Any product that is being
transported from one location to another over large distances
will likely traverse our nation’s interstates, whether that
product is an illegal substance or produce being delivered to
a supermarket chain. Further, while drug traffickers may, of
necessity, use the interstate system, so too do those
commuting to work on a daily basis and those heading to
recreational activities or a long overdue family vacation. In
other words, the interstates are used too heavily and for too
many purposes to be properly classified as high-crime areas.
More critical, however, is an examination of what
constitutes “unprovoked flight.” The Court, in Wardlow,
noted the relevance of “nervous, evasive behavior [as] a
pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.”153 The
Court continued by describing “[h]eadlong flight—wherever
it occurs—[as] the consummate act of evasion . . . .”154
as contemplated in Wardlow, the court in United States v. Yousif noted that the
Sugar Tree Road exit was selected as the ruse checkpoint exit partly “because
law enforcement officers believed that I-44 was a commonly used route for
transporting drugs . . . .” 308 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 2002). Exiting the highway
could conceivably serve as evidence of the second factor relied on by the Wardlow
court: unprovoked flight. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. One article has classified
a driver’s choice to exit the highway as follows: “When a drug courier chooses to
exit the interstate in order to avoid what appears to be an upcoming narcotics
checkpoint, he or she is engaging in evasive behavior.” Dinger & Dinger, supra
note 22, at 37. Because the exiting driver is “evading imminent contact with law
enforcement,” his conduct “gives rise to reasonable suspicion under Wardlow.” Id.
The authors also turn to the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Arvizu
for additional support. Id. at 37–39. In United States v. Arvizu, the Court upheld
the stop of the defendant who was traveling on an unpaved and “little-traveled
route used by smugglers to avoid the [Border Patrol] checkpoint.” 534 U.S. at 277.
However, the choice of road, although it added significantly to the calculation of
reasonable suspicion, was just one of numerous factors relied on by law
enforcement in a totality analysis. Id.
153. 528 U.S. at 124.
154. Id.
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However, the Court also emphasized that “when an officer,
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches
an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police
and go about his business.”155 The Court was quick to point
out, however, that although “refusal to cooperate, without
more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective
justification needed for a detention or seizure,”156 when an
individual engages in unprovoked flight, he does more than
refuse to cooperate: “[f]light, by its very nature, is not ‘going
about one’s business’; in fact, it is just the opposite.”157
Putting aside, for now, that the nonexistent checkpoint
being advertised on the interstate would be (if it existed)
unlawful under Edmond,158 the driver who exits the road is
merely seeking to avoid a seizure that is based neither on
reasonable suspicion nor probable cause. While he may have
altered his route, his apparent “business” is to drive from one
location to another, and by exiting, he seeks to continue going
about that business without having to stop. As previously
mentioned,159 the choice to exit may have as much to do with
seeking to avoid traffic congestion or the hassle of having to
stop, wait in a line, and search for and produce vehicle
documentation as it has to do with avoiding contact with the
police. But even if the driver’s exit is motivated by the desire
to steer clear of the police, this does not necessarily establish

155. Id. at 125 (referring to the Court’s prior holding in Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 498 (1983)).
156. Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)).
157. Id.
158. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 32 (2000); supra text
accompanying notes 60–63.
159. See supra text immediately following note 24. Of course, there could also
be a myriad of reasons to use a particular exit off an interstate that have nothing
to do with the advertised checkpoint. As stated by the court in Yousif: “Moreover,
because there is nothing inherently unlawful or suspicious about a vehicle (even
one with out-of-state license plates) exiting the highway, it should not be the case
that the placement of signs by the police in front of the exit ramp transforms that
facially innocent behavior into grounds for suspecting criminal activity.” United
States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 829 (8th Cir. 2002).
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criminal wrongdoing, as noted by Justice Stevens in his
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz dissent:
Unwanted attention from the local police need not be less
discomforting simply because one’s secrets are not the stuff of
criminal prosecutions. Moreover, those who have found—by reason
of prejudice or misfortune—that encounters with the police may
become adversarial or unpleasant without good cause will have
grounds for worrying at any stop designed to elicit signs of
suspicious behavior.160

Returning to the idea that the exiting driver is declining
the invitation to be seized without individualized suspicion,
it is important to recall what Edmond instructs regarding
such seizures:
The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be
reasonable. A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the
absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. While such
suspicion is not an “irreducible” component of reasonableness, we
have recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual rule
does not apply. . . . We have . . . upheld brief, suspicionless seizures
of motorists at a fixed Border Patrol Checkpoint designed to
intercept illegal aliens, and at a sobriety checkpoint aimed at
removing drunk drivers from the road. In addition, . . . we
suggested that a similar type of roadblock with the purpose of
verifying drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations would be
permissible. In none of these cases, however, did we indicate
approval of a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.161

In other words, suspicionless mass seizures arising from
checkpoints conducted for purposes of highway safety or
immigration enforcement would be unreasonable, were it not
for the fact that they served important societal interests
apart from ordinary crime control and law enforcement. Now
if one considers the fact that the ruse checkpoint is
advertised as a drug interdiction checkpoint, which, if it
existed, would clearly violate the Fourth Amendment, using
160. 496 U.S. 444, 465 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. 531 U.S. at 37–38 (internal citations omitted).
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the fact that the driver has exited the highway in order to
avoid being unreasonably seized to generate reasonable
suspicion is especially problematic. Judge Denvir Stith’s
words bear repeating: “[t]here is something fundamentally
unsettling and counterintuitive about labeling as suspicious
a person’s conduct in avoiding the state’s own
unconstitutional conduct.”162
This raises the question not only of whether exiting the
interstate constitutes flight, but more importantly, even if so,
whether it is “unprovoked.” There seems to be a vast
difference from the facts of Wardlow, where the defendant
took off running at the mere sight of police officers, even
though there was no indication that he was personally
subject to their attention,163 and the driver who exits the
interstate in order to prevent himself, personally, from being
unlawfully seized. When the police threaten to unlawfully
seize an individual, and that individual chooses not to be
seized, is his decision to remove himself from the situation
truly “unprovoked?” This author believes there is a strong
argument for not ascribing any, let alone significant, weight
in a totality analysis to a citizen’s decision to exit the
highway prior to an announced unreasonable seizure.
Of course, if the police rely instead on the occurrence of
a traffic violation to conduct the stop, rather than on
reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, it is not necessary
to engage in any totality analysis at all, as all that is required
to justify the stop is the officer’s observation of the traffic

162. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 717 (Denver Stith, J., dissenting).
163. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 122 (2000) (“Respondent looked in the
direction of the officers and fled.”). This is not to say that fleeing from the scene
of anticipated police activity in an area known for drug trafficking necessarily
implicates one in individual wrongdoing. As Justice Stevens noted, “[I]t is a
matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes
fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty
parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses.” Id. at 131 (Stevens. J.,
dissenting) (quoting Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896)). However,
I wish to contrast the facts of Wardlow with the usual ruse checkpoint facts,
where the exiting motorist wants to avoid his own threatened seizure.
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offense. Part III will address the traffic stop (the third
variation of the ruse checkpoint), arguing that, Whren
notwithstanding,164 the police should not be permitted to use
pretextual traffic stops to conduct a narcotics investigation
in the ruse checkpoint scenario. Before turning to Part III,
however, the next Section of this Part further addresses
avoidance and suspicion and explores a fascinating
dichotomy between seizures and searches with respect the
assertion of one’s Fourth Amendment rights.
B. The Fork in the Road to Fourth Amendment Protection:
Asserting the Right to Liberty versus the Right to Privacy
Turning back to Wardlow, how could the defendant have
avoided being seized without furnishing the reasonable
suspicion used to justify his eventual seizure when he was
apprehended? Perhaps he could have continued standing
near that building, ignoring the police, and “going about his
business.” Perhaps he could have walked away casually,
being careful not to walk so quickly as to cross the line
between avoidance and flight (or to catch the eye of the
passing officers). But how does the driver, once notified of the
upcoming checkpoint, implement his decision to not
cooperate with the police interaction he believes to be ahead?
Vehicle checkpoints are clearly considered seizures for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment,165 but it is instructive
here to examine the definition of a seizure. In Terry v. Ohio,
the Court defined a seizure in terms of an officer’s use of
“physical force or show of authority” to “in some way
restrain[] the liberty of a citizen.”166 In U.S. v. Mendenhall,
the Court further refined the definition of a seizure as
follows: “[a] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the
164. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); supra text accompanying
note 9.
165. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450.
166. 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
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circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave.”167 The
Court added the final piece to the definition of a seizure in
California v. Hodari D., holding that one is not seized for
Fourth Amendment purposes until such time as one comes
under the control of the police, either by submission to
authority or through the use of physical force.168
Seizures, then, are all about compulsion. An individual
is seized once his interaction with police has reached the
point where a reasonable person in those circumstances
would feel compelled to remain under police control, even if
only temporarily. Of course, seizures must by nature be
compulsive—chances are that most people who are stopped
or arrested would rather not be. So, whereas compulsion is
permitted and likely necessary in the context of the Fourth
Amendment seizure, in at least two other key areas of
criminal procedure, compulsion by the police is not
permitted. First, in the context of Fourth Amendment
searches, a suspect cannot be coerced into granting consent
to search and any consent given must be voluntary in order
to be valid.169 Secondly, in the context of police interrogation,
the Fifth Amendment states, in the relevant part, that no
person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.”170 In order to protect the right
against compelled self-incrimination, police must provide
suspects in custody with their Miranda warnings, advising

167. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Note that this is an objective test, based on the
perception of the reasonable detainee, rather than on the subjective intent of the
officer, although ultimately, it is the latter that determines whether or not one
will be free to leave.
168. 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991).
169. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Suspects also have protection under the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which have been held
to prohibit the introduction of confessions that are deemed to be involuntary. See
id. amend V, XIV. See also, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936)
(holding that the use of confessions obtained through torture and brutality
constitutes “a clear denial of due process.”).
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them, among other things, of their right to remain silent.171
Further, if a suspect being subjected to custodial
interrogation asserts the right to remain silent, or the right
to have an attorney present, the police must cease the
interrogation, thereby preventing the compelled statement
from being made.172 Thus, there is a mechanism for the
suspect to assert his right to be free of compulsion, and
safeguards in place to ensure that he can enjoy that right.
In contrast, however, while a suspect can assert his right
to be free of a potential Fifth Amendment violation by way of
a compelled statement, there is no clear mechanism for an
individual to assert the right to be free of a Fourth
Amendment violation by way of an unreasonable seizure.173
In fact, the driver approaching a ruse checkpoint faces quite
the dilemma: until he reaches the checkpoint, he is not
seized, and therefore, has, at least in theory, freedom of
movement. However, if he exercises that freedom to avoid
being compelled to stop and submit to the police, his
assertion, by changing his course, of the right to be free of a
suspicionless seizure supplies the suspicion that can, in large
part, justify his being compelled to stop after all. Or,
alternatively, his choice to freely change his route will
subject him to particularly vigilant traffic code enforcement
as waiting officers try “to get reason to stop [him].”174
An even starker contrast can be found within Fourth
Amendment law, particularly with respect to how citizens
seek to protect themselves from unlawful searches versus

171. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966).
172. Id. at 473–74.
173. Of course, if a defendant has been unreasonably seized, he can assert his
Fourth Amendment rights post hoc by seeking to suppress any evidence gained
as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions by holding that
“all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution
is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”). Of course, this is not
the same as avoiding the seizure in the first place.
174. United States v. Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2006).
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seizures. In order for government surveillance to be deemed
a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, the government
must “obtain information by physically intruding on a
constitutionally protected area,” or in the absence of such an
intrusion, obtain information by violating one’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.175 Of particular interest here is the
fact that, in order to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment with respect to searches by establishing a
reasonable expectation of privacy, one must vigorously assert
and safeguard that privacy. If one fails to exercise sufficient
diligence to hide from view what one “seeks to preserve as
private,”176 one loses Fourth Amendment protection over
what is in fact seen.177 Thus, even though one may ultimately
be unsuccessful at keeping the object targeted by police
surveillance hidden, the fact that significant precautions
were taken to preserve privacy ensures that, at the very
least, the police will need to abide by the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment (generally, a warrant and probable
175. The “reasonable expectation privacy” test used to define a search in the
absence of a physical intrusion is derived from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967), and in particular from Justice Harlan’s formulation, found in his
concurrence, which recognized a Fourth Amendment search as occurring when
the government violates “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
176. Id. at 351.
177. Perhaps one of the most stringent applications of this principle can be
found in California v. Ciraolo, where the Court upheld surveillance by two police
officers from a private plane flying at 1,000 feet of the defendant’s back yard. 476
U.S. 207, 209, 215 (1986). Despite the fact that the defendant had enclosed his
yard with two tall fences, the Court found that he did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his yard, at least not from aerial observation. Id. at 209,
214. The defendant had, of course, asserted that “he ha[d] done all that can
reasonably be expected to tell the world he wishes to maintain the privacy of his
garden . . . without covering his yard.” Id. at 211. I have elsewhere argued that
the Court’s search doctrine, particular in how it defines when a Fourth
Amendment search has occurred, requires citizens to take extreme or “utmost”
precautions to maintain privacy. See Nadia B. Soree, Show and Tell, Seek and
Find: A Balanced Approach to Defining a Fourth Amendment Search and the
Lessons of Rape Reform, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 210 (2013) (analogizing the
utmost resistance requirement in traditional rape law to the Court’s narrow
definition of a Fourth Amendment search).
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cause) when conducting that surveillance.
On the other hand, when a citizen vigorously seeks to
maintain the integrity of his person and his freedom of
movement by choosing to not drive into a checkpoint (an
unlawful one, at that), his Fourth Amendment protection is
actually diminished through his assertion of the right to be
free from unreasonable seizures, and he is more vulnerable
to being stopped. In fact, his own actions in seeking to avoid
the advertised narcotics checkpoint help transform what
would have been an unlawful stop at a highway checkpoint
into a lawful one on the side of a rural road. While this
dichotomy of approaches to Fourth Amendment protection
may seem logical—after all, searches and seizures are
different in nature—it also seems counterintuitive that an
individual can do very little to avoid being unconstitutionally
seized, even if the feared seizure is miles ahead.
Further, although initially it seems that searches and
seizures threaten different interests, if one adopts the
eloquent and powerful description of Fourth Amendment
privacy as “the right to be let alone” provided by Justices
Warren and Brandeis in their groundbreaking article, The
Right to Privacy,178 then one sees that the individual who
draws his blinds against the prying eyes of the government
is essentially protecting the same interest as the driver who
takes the exit in order to keep driving without interference
from that same government. One cannot escape noting the
irony that, had our driver simply continued down the
interstate, he would never have encountered a checkpoint at
all because such a checkpoint would be, of course, unlawful
under Edmond. The next Part explores the significance of
this very important fact: that the success of the ruse
checkpoint as a law enforcement technique is predicated on
the government’s threat to violate the Fourth Amendment.

178. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890).
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III. CALLING ALL CARS, FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION
AHEAD: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE INADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH A THREATENED
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
This Part turns once more to Kentucky v. King,179 which
was briefly detailed in the Introduction.180 To refresh the
reader’s memory, in King, the Court addressed the extent to
which police may rely on the presence of exigent
circumstances to justify a warrantless entry into a home
when the police had a role in creating the exigency.181 The
Court upheld the search as reasonable, stating that “[w]here,
as here, the police did not create the exigency by engaging or
threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth
Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of
evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.”182 Therefore, when
officers, smelling the odor of marijuana emanating from an
apartment, banged loudly on the door, apparently leading
the occupants of the apartment to begin destroying the
evidence, the officers were permitted to forcibly enter in
order to preserve that evidence.183 The Court admonished:
“[o]ccupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional
rights but instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence have
only themselves to blame for the warrantless exigentcircumstances search that may ensue.”184
Arguably, the result in King would have been different
had the police, rather than simply banging and identifying
themselves, threatened to immediately break down the door.
Notice, under these alternative facts, the occupants no longer
have the choice to “stand on their constitutional rights.” If

179. See 563 U.S. 452 (2011).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 40–43.
181. 563 U.S. at 461.
182. Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 456.
184. Id. at 470.
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they ignore the knock on the door, or indeed demand that the
police return with a warrant, the police will nevertheless
enter illegally if they follow through on the threat. As the
King Court repeatedly emphasized the fact that the officers
did not violate or threaten to violate the Fourth
Amendment,185 it is safe to assume that under our
alternative scenario, the police would no longer be permitted
to effectuate a warrantless entry based on exigent
circumstances, despite the fact that the occupants may very
well be destroying evidence (something that they have no
constitutional right to do), and therefore, the exigency is real.
What matters more than the existence of the exigency under
these circumstances is the manner in which it arose.
Analogizing the holding of King to the ruse checkpoint,
just as the police may not create an exigency, which
ordinarily would permit a warrantless entry, by violating or
threatening to violate the Fourth Amendment—real as that
exigency may be, assuming that evidence is actually being
destroyed as a result of the officers’ actions—police may not
create suspicion or create the opportunity to establish
objective justification by violating or threatening to violate
the Fourth Amendment. The ruse checkpoint is just that: a
clear and manifest threat to violate the right to be free of
unreasonable seizures. When the threat has the desired
effect, causing drivers to exit the highway, police are ready
and waiting to observe additional suspicious activity leading
to reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking or the commission
of a traffic offense—real or fabricated.
While the Court has not directly addressed ruse
narcotics checkpoints, this author believes that its decision
in King should inform the inquiry in the present context as
well. If the King decision is to be taken to its logical
conclusion and applied to the ruse checkpoint, the driver’s
choice to exit the highway should play no role in establishing
reasonable suspicion. Further, regardless of Whren v. United
185. Id. at 455, 462, 472.
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States, police should not be permitted to use the traffic stop
as a pretext to conduct a narcotics investigation, even when
(or if) the driver has committed a traffic violation.186
Edmond addressed Whren’s holding when formulating
its primary purpose test for narcotics checkpoints, noting
that “Whren therefore reinforces the principle that, while
[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probablecause Fourth Amendment analysis, programmatic purposes
may be relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment
intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without
individualized suspicion.”187 Arguably, the ruse checkpoint
is, in fact, a scheme conducted without individualized
suspicion, as all motorists are in some way subjected to the
ruse, even though the stop of an individual motorist may be
based, at least technically, on probable cause of a traffic
violation. While it may be difficult in ordinary circumstances
to discern the exact motivation of an officer when he stops a
motorist, it is abundantly and objectively clear that during
the ruse checkpoint operation, that motivation is to
investigate narcotics trafficking. Thus, this author argues
that Edmond could be read to support an inquiry into the
programmatic purposes of the ruse checkpoint, creating a
presumption that when the officer acting pursuant to the
ruse checkpoint program stops a motorist—even one who has
committed a traffic violation—he is truly conducting a
narcotics investigation.
One solution to rehabilitate a post-ruse checkpoint
traffic stop would be to require police to shoulder a
heightened burden of demonstrating that the traffic stop was
indeed motivated by the desire to enforce the traffic laws in
order to overcome that presumption.188 However, a more
186. See 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996).
187. 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
188. While determining whether an officer was truly acting from a trafficenforcement motivation may again prove challenging, objective factors, such as
the severity of the alleged traffic violation, could help inform such a
determination.
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definitive and easily administered solution would be simply
to create a rule that evidence obtained as a direct result of a
ruse checkpoint operation is inadmissible. In other words,
the police should not benefit from a threatened violation of
the Fourth Amendment.189
Of course, the exclusionary rule serves to remedy an
actual constitutional violation, so a question arises as to
whether the ruse, as a threat to violate the Fourth
Amendment constitutes a violation in itself, or whether the
actual constitutional violation occurs only when the driver is
seized. Again, King is instructive, although not a perfect fit.
If one assumes that the outcome of King would have been
different had the officers violated or threatened to violate the
Fourth Amendment, and through that misconduct, created
the exigency, the actual constitutional violation would have
been the warrantless entry into the apartment. If the
baseline for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is
the warrant requirement,190 the officers’ ability to enter
without a warrant must be based on an exception to that
requirement, such as the existence of an exigency.191 Because
the officers are seeking to justify what otherwise would be an
unreasonable search by asserting an exception to the
warrant requirement, it is reasonable to insist, as the Court
189. This approach is consistent with what the Court has stated to be the
primary justification for exclusion: “The rule is calculated to prevent, not to
repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
190. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by
a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent”).
191. The Court in King noted the existence of various exceptions to the warrant
requirement, stating that “[o]ne well-recognized exception applies when the
exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that
[a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 394 (1978)). See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent
exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a
warrant.”).
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did in King, that the police misconduct did not create the
circumstances—the exigency—that the officers then wish to
exploit. Thus, in effect, if the police violate the Fourth
Amendment or threaten to do so, the exception to the
warrant requirement is unavailable, rendering their
warrantless entry indeed unreasonable. It is critical for
purposes of the analogy to the ruse checkpoint to highlight
that, for the King Court, in reaching its holding, the threat
to violate the Fourth Amendment is as egregious as conduct
that actually constitutes a violation of that Amendment.
In the ruse narcotics checkpoint context, one cannot say
that the threat to violate the Fourth Amendment—the sign
advertising an unlawful narcotics checkpoint ahead—is itself
a violation, because until a driver is actually stopped, there
has been no seizure, nor search, under the Fourth
Amendment. Addressing the first and second-generation
ruse checkpoint stops, where the driver’s decision to exit the
highway either generates entirely,192 or significantly
contributes to,193 the reasonable suspicion used to justify the
stop, it is fairly straightforward to argue that a citizen’s
choice to prevent an unreasonable seizure of his person
should not be used as an indication of wrongdoing.194 When
the citizen’s choice to exit the highway is no longer taken into
account, it will be much more difficult to establish the
reasonable suspicion necessary to render the subsequent
seizure reasonable.
The third-generation ruse checkpoint stop, based on a
traffic violation committed by the driver after having exited
192. As previously mentioned, most courts require more than simply exiting
the highway to establish reasonable suspicion. See supra text accompanying note
29.
193. For discussion of cases in which the driver’s decision to exit the highway
plays a significant role in establishing reasonable suspicion, see supra Section
I.B.
194. Further, although the avoidance of the checkpoint is only one factor in a
totality, it is highly likely that if a court were precluded from considering that
fact in its analysis, the remaining factors would not be sufficient to rise to the
level of reasonable suspicion.
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the interstate, presents a bit more of a challenge in the
exclusionary rule analysis. The officers in King actually
entered the apartment without benefit of a warrant, which
would have constituted a per se violation of the Fourth
Amendment, had it not been for a valid exception to the
warrant requirement. On the other hand, under Whren, the
warrantless traffic stop is reasonable, as long as it is based
on probable cause that the driver committed a traffic offense.
To call the pretextual traffic stop unreasonable (despite the
existence of probable cause) requires a new understanding of
Whren. Many commentators, including this author, have
been critical of Whren as a decision that permits officers
broad discretion to investigate criminal activity unrelated to
the traffic offense for which a driver is actually detained.195
If Whren, however, is reframed as an exception to the
requirement of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the
Court’s ruling in King has great significance.
Imagine an officer who believes, but has neither probable
cause nor reasonable suspicion, that a driver of a particular
vehicle is engaged in criminal activity, such as drug
trafficking or possession. Of course, under Whren, the basis
of the officer’s belief does not matter, whether it arises from
the location, the type of vehicle being driven, or the age,
gender, or even race of the driver.196 Knowing that he cannot
stop the driver and vehicle to investigate the criminal
activity he believes is occurring, he patiently waits for the
driver to commit a traffic violation—a failure to signal,
perhaps. Now the officer has the probable cause needed to
stop the vehicle for the traffic violation, and the opportunity
to conduct the narcotics investigation he would otherwise not
have been permitted to conduct.
This calls for an understanding of the pretextual traffic
stop as, in fact, a suspicionless investigatory stop, rendered
reasonable only by the existence of an independent,
195. See supra note 9.
196. Id.
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unrelated (to the narcotics investigation) source of objective
probable cause. Just as the objective existence of an exigency
creates an exception allowing the warrantless entry into a
home, the objective existence of a traffic violation creates, in
effect, an exception to the requirement that a stop conducted
for purposes of investigating criminal activity be based on
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of such activity,
which this author will refer to, for purposes of the analogy to
King, as the Whren exception.197
Under the hypothetical King facts, officers who create
the exigency by a violation or threatened violation of the
Fourth Amendment could not then benefit from the exigent
circumstances exception to render their warrantless search
reasonable. Similarly, officers who threaten to violate the
Fourth Amendment through the ruse checkpoint operation
should not benefit from the Whren exception to render their
subsequent narcotics stops reasonable. One could argue that
the advertised checkpoint threat does not actually cause the
driver to commit a traffic violation in the same way that the
threat to violate the Fourth Amendment may cause the
occupants of an apartment to destroy evidence. Nonetheless,
the causal connection between the ruse and the traffic
offense is undeniably strong. Not only does the ruse provide
officers with the opportunity to target specific drivers (who
find themselves on an unfamiliar road, often late at night)
with a heightened purpose of observing a traffic offense, but
as was seen in United States v. Johnson, the very location of
the ruse may create a virtual certainty that a traffic offense
will be committed.198 Thus, when the government’s threat to
violate the Fourth Amendment creates the strong likelihood
that a traffic violation will be committed or observed,
government officers should not be permitted to use Whren to
insulate what is, in fact, a narcotics investigation from
constitutional scrutiny and the requirements of

197. This “exception” in effect provides a substitute source of probable cause.
198. See 59 M.J. 666, 668 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2003).
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individualized suspicion of narcotics-related wrongdoing.
Finally, what of Justice Alito’s call, in King, to an
informed and self-assured citizenry to assert their
constitutional rights?199 The drivers who exit the interstate
after being warned of an upcoming narcotics checkpoint are,
albeit perhaps unknowingly, seeking to do just that.
However, in the ruse checkpoint cases, rather than
successfully avoiding an unconstitutional seizure, these
drivers find themselves directly confronted by the police,
stopped either because their desire not to be seized becomes
a sign of wrongdoing or because they commit a traffic
violation, no matter how minor—or simply because they are
in the wrong place at the wrong time.
CONCLUSION
Simply put, the use of ruse checkpoints to target drivers
violates the Fourth Amendment, or more precisely, the
seizures resulting from the ruse are unreasonable. When the
government threatens to violate the Fourth Amendment, it
behaves unreasonably for purposes of that Amendment, and
the advantages gained from such behavior should not
permitted. The questions arising from use of the ruse
checkpoint, such as through what mechanisms a citizen can
assert his right to be free from unreasonable seizures, or to
what extent a citizen’s avoidance of police interaction should
be factored into an analysis of suspicion, or even to what
extent officers should be permitted to conduct pretextual
traffic stops, are not easily answered. Further, this Article
does not suggest that police should abandon their efforts to
interdict drugs, but argues that the methods used to do so
matter.
Thus, while difficulties arise in attempting to answer the
above questions, the solution to this particular issue is
startlingly simple: police should not be permitted to conduct

199. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 468–70 (2011).
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ruse checkpoints, and if a ruse checkpoint produces evidence,
it should be inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. While
the government is diligently seeking to enforce the laws, it
must do so in a way that demonstrates respect for
constitutional rights, rather than through the use of threats
to abrogate those rights in order to achieve its ends.200 Courts
should be cautious of on overly permissive approach to such
deceptive tactics as exemplified by the ruse checkpoint, and
draw the line suggested by King. As it stands now, the
drivers who “choose [] to stand on their constitutional rights”
by driving away from the advertised—but nonexistent—
unlawful checkpoint may very well find themselves instead
standing on the side of the road, watching as their cars are
searched. As Judge Denvir Stith pointedly stated, “[t]he
public should not be put to such a choice.”201

200. As stated by Justice Brandeis in his famous Olmstead dissent, “[i]f the
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.” Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
201. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 717 (Mo. 2002) (Denvir Stith, J.,
dissenting).

